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Summary
Indonesia’s President, Abdurrahman Wahid, faces a major separatist insurgency in
the province of Aceh in northern Sumatra.  Wahid has proposed autonomy for Aceh, but
insurgents demand independence.  Negotiations for a cease-fire continue. Wahid has been
unable to control the Indonesian military, whose aggressive actions in Aceh are
producing reports of growing human rights abuses and alienation of the populace.  The
Clinton Administration has offered advice to Wahid, including advice to seek a political
settlement; but it has been hesitant to deal with the military’s actions.
The Indonesian government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, elected in October
1999, faces separatist movements in several parts of the Indonesian archipelago. The
emergence and/or growth of these movements have been influenced by East Timor’s
decision for independence in a United Nations-sponsored referendum of August 31, 1999.
The most serious of these movements is in the province of Aceh.  Aceh is located on the
northern tip of Sumatra, the westernmost of Indonesia’s major islands.  Aceh is positioned
on the Malacca Strait opposite Malaysia, a strategic waterway connecting the Pacific and
Indian oceans.  Aceh’s population is estimated at five million.  The population is
predominantly Muslim.  Aceh has abundant resources of natural gas and timber.  Aceh
exported $1.3 billion worth of natural gas in 1998.1
The Separatist Movement
The leading separatist organization is Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh), which came into
existence in the 1970s and issued a declaration of independence in 1976.  Aceh Merdeka,
with the initials GAM, is waging an insurgency with a military force estimated between
800 and 2,000.  The GAM is able to conduct guerrilla-style attacks in about half of the
province.  It appears to have achieved substantial public support, as evidenced by pro-
independence demonstrations in late November 1999, which drew over 500,000 people.
It appears to have a political organization throughout Aceh.  It reportedly is able to collect
taxes throughout Aceh.  In January 2000, the commander of Indonesian police units in
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Aceh acknowledged that community leaders, religious leaders, and local government
officials were not supporting Indonesian security forces against the GAM.2  
Outside knowledge of the leadership, makeup, and ideology, of the GAM is limited.
The GAM professes the aim of establishing Aceh as an Islamic kingdom.  It reportedly has
received material assistance from Iran, Libya, and sympathizers in Southeast Asia.  Its
official leader, Hasan de Tiro, is exiled in Sweden.  He is U.S.-educated, at Columbia
University in New York and Plano University in Texas.  He describes himself as pro-U.S.
and says he would seek U.S. support.3  Abdullah Syafei commands GAM guerrillas in
Aceh.  GAM cadre located in Malaysia seem to be another important component of the
GAM that sometimes express independent political positions.
Several other  Acehnese groups have separatist leanings, but some of these appear
to differ with the insurgency strategy of the GAM and oppose a GAM monopoly in
negotiating with the Indonesian government.  Muslim religious leaders are influential.
Student groups have become increasingly important as pro-independence sentiment has
emerged into the open since 1998.  A conference of civic and political Acehnese leaders
from throughout Aceh met on November 14, 2000, and adopted a declaration that
demanded a return of sovereignty to the Acehnese people and for mediation by the United
Nations and foreign governments.4
The causes of separatism and alienation in Aceh are a combination of four factors:
(1) Aceh has a distinct history as an independent kingdom from the 15th century until
the beginning of the 20th century.  It maintained diplomatic and consular relations with
several states, including Great Britain.  It exchanged diplomatic notes with the United
States.5  In 1873, the Dutch invaded Aceh and conquered it after a war that lasted until
1904.  Hasan de Tiro is a descendant of the last Sultan, who was killed fighting the Dutch.
(2) There has been a progressive alienation of the population in reaction to the
policies of successive Indonesian governments since Indonesia won independence from the
Netherlands in 1949.  The Indonesian government abolished the province of Aceh in 1950,
prompting the first revolt of the Acehnese in the early 1950s.  In 1959, the Indonesian
government declared Aceh a special territory with autonomy in religious and education
affairs, but the government never implemented this special status.  From the 1960s, Aceh
was subject to increased centralization of power in Jakarta under President Suharto.
Revolts, aiming at independence, occurred in the 1970s and late 1980s.
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(3) Extensive human rights abuses by the Indonesian military has been documented.
Successive Indonesian governments relied on military repression in dealing with dissidence
in Aceh.  Military abuses of civilians reportedly became common in the 1970s and 1980s.
This peaked during the revolt in the late 1980s. In congressional testimony in 1992, Sidney
Jones, Executive Director of Asia Watch, detailed killings, disappearances, and torture
committed by the Indonesian military in Aceh.6  Mass graves were uncovered in 1998 by
Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights.  Another Indonesian military
crackdown occurred after May 1989, resulting in the killing of several hundred people
(some reportedly massacred by the military), widespread destruction, and over 100,000
people fleeing their homes.7
(4) Aceh’s wealth has gone to the central government.  By the 1970s, discontent
arose over the flow of  wealth from Aceh’s natural resources.  Upwards of 80-90% of this
wealth has gone to Java, Indonesia’s most populous island and the center of Indonesian
political power.8  This prompted dissident Acehnese to claim that Aceh was the object of
Javanese colonialism, which had replaced Dutch colonialism.
Wahid’s Policies and Attempts to Achieve a Cease-Fire
The Wahid administration is a coalition of individuals and groups with little or no
prior government experience or little experience in top decision-making levels.  The same
is true of the parliament elected in June 1999.  President Wahid has rejected independence
for Aceh, but he has acknowledged that the Acehnese have legitimate grievances. Before
and shortly after taking office, he proposed granting Aceh “status as a special region” with
a priority to Islamic law, a referendum to determine Acehnese sentiment, a redistribution
of wealth from Aceh’s natural resources with Aceh receiving 75% rather than 10%, and
a cease-fire.9  Wahid has spoken of extensive financial aid to Aceh, the money to come
from Middle Eastern countries.    
 Escalating violence in early 2000 led Wahid to seek talks with the GAM.  The talks
produced a “Humanitarian Pause” signed  May 12, 2000.  Effective for three months, it
was extended in September until January 15, 2001.  It established two committees: one to
coordinate humanitarian programs in Aceh and the second to secure an end to violence.
In November 2000, the Wahid Administration submitted draft legislation to the Indonesian
parliament for “special autonomy” for Aceh based on a proposal by Aceh’s provincial
parliament.  However, Wahid and other officials announced in December 2000 that the
government would not extend the Humanitarian Pause beyond January 15, 2001.  Officials
stated that the government no longer would negotiate solely with the GAM but would talk
to many elements of the Acehnese population.  However, negotiations with the GAM
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produced on January 10, 2001,a “Provision of Understanding,” effective for one month
as of January 16, 2001, intended to end violence.
Two related factors damaged the effectiveness of the Humanitarian Pause and raise
doubts about prospects for the Provision of Understanding.  The first is the failure of
Indonesian-GAM negotiations to settle the issue of Aceh’s political future.  GAM leaders
continue to demand independence.10  The Government’s unilateral plan for Aceh autonomy
legislation reflects the impasse. 
The second  factor is Wahid’s failure to gain control over the Indonesian military
(TNI) in Aceh.  Upon taking office, he ordered all regular combat forces to withdraw from
Aceh.  The order was never fully carried out.  In January 2000, he successfully resisted
pressure from military leaders to declare martial law in Aceh.11  Wahid directed military
leaders in April 2000 to remove the police commander in Aceh and investigate accusations
that he had ordered the widespread burning of houses and villages.  In November 1999,
the Independent Commission on Violent Acts in Aceh found that high ranking military
officers were complicit in atrocities and other human rights abuses; it recommended five
trials.  The first trial began in April 2000 of 24 military personnel accused of massacring
62 people.  The military personnel were convicted and received 8.5 to 10 year sentences,
but no commanding officers were among the 24.  No other trials have been held.
Despite Wahid’s actions, police and military units began more aggressive military
operations, codenamed Rencong III, that by March 2000 produced reports of mounting
human rights abuses.  One such incident occurred in March when army units swept
through villages near the site of a meeting between a representative of President Wahid
and the GAM military commander in Aceh.12 
The Humanitarian Pause only had a temporary impact on the TNI’s conduct.  By
October 2000, reports appeared that military personnel, sometimes disguised as police, had
resumed sweeps through villages, burning and killing villagers.  The sweeps sometimes
were in response to GAM attacks on military or police posts or ambushes of military
vehicles on the road.  However, there appears to be a pattern of TNI retaliation against
civilians.  The TNI also was believed responsible for the jailing and murder of several
Acehnese civic and religious leaders in late 2000.  A group of Danish-sponsored aid
workers were slain apparently by Indonesian soldiers, and human rights workers accused
the TNI of torturing three people working for Oxfam International.  In November 2000,
the TNI killed at least 41 people in an attempt to prevent the holding of another pro-
referendum rally in Aceh’s capital.  About 400 killings occurred between the signing of the
Humanitarian Pause and the end of 2000.  TNI leaders reportedly oppose the
Humanitarian Pause, continue to argue for martial law, and plan increased military
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operations after January 15, 2001.13  This raises the possibility of a major human rights
crisis in Aceh, perhaps similar to the 1991 and 1999 human rights crises in East Timor,14
if President Wahid cannot change the behavior of the military and produce a
comprehensive political settlement acceptable to the Acehnese.  
U.S. Policy on Aceh
There has been an  increase in U.S. attention to the Aceh issue since President Wahid
took office in October 1999.  Successive U.S. administrations and Congresses traditionally
had ignored the Aceh conflict, concentrating on East Timor.  In a November 1999
interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Stanley Roth stated that the conduct of the Indonesian military–“Aceh in particular”–is
now a defining issue in U.S.-Indonesian relations.15  The State Department issued a
statement on Aceh on April 26, 2000 (see below).
U.S. policy toward Aceh has been within the context of the Clinton Administration’s
stated goal of supporting the Wahid government and “a successful democratic transition
in Indonesia” following 30 years of authoritarian rule under Suharto.  The Administration
designated Indonesia as one of the world’s four priority emerging democracies.16  It voiced
support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and urged the GAM to negotiate a settlement
within a united Indonesia. U.S. Ambassador Robert Gelbard described the GAM’s demand
for independence as “very unrealistic because these demands have never been supported
by the International community.”17  The Administration adopted the role of an adviser to
the Indonesian government on Aceh.  This was carried out through the State Department,
the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, and through the auspices of the U.S. Institute for Peace.  The
advice reportedly focused on examples of conflict resolution used by other governments,
urging the Indonesian government to seek a political rather than a military solution, and
suggesting that President Wahid appoint a special policy coordinator on Aceh.18  U.S.
Ambassador Robert Gelbard reportedly promised U.S. economic aid to develop
infrastructure in Aceh.19  In HR 5526 (106th Congress), foreign operations appropriations
for 2001, Congress earmarked $5 million for economic aid to Aceh.
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U.S. officials have not commented publicly on the failure of Indonesian-GAM
negotiations..  They also appear uncertain over policy towards the mounting human rights
abuses of the Indonesian military.  At a news conference in Jakarta on March 3, Under
Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stated U.S. support for a political solution.  He gave
ambiguous answers to questions regarding the Indonesia’s military’s more aggressive
actions in Aceh, reports of new human rights abuses, and whether he had raised these
issues with Indonesian officials.20  In a press conference of April 3, 2000, Admiral Dennis
Blair, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, concentrated on East Timor
issues in describing obstacles to the restoration of U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation.
He mentioned Aceh only in reply to a question, but he asserted that the Indonesian military
in Aceh needed “to follow rules of engagement”and that there should be “accountability
for their actions.”21 The State Department’s April 26 statement on Aceh condemned
violence “by all parties,” but it criticized specifically only the GAM, especially for its
attacks on U.S. companies (Mobil Oil).  Ambassador Gelbard  criticized openly the lack
of reform of the TNI and the TNI’s conduct in relation to East Timor.  This made him the
target of accusations from Wahid Administration officials and politicians that he is
meddling in Indonesia’s internal affairs.  
The murder of an American  human rights worker in Aceh (his body was discovered
on September 7, 2000) led to the introduction of a resolution, H.Res. 580 (106th
Congress), in the House of Representatives calling on the U.S. State Department and the
Indonesian government to investigate thoroughly the murder and “to devote official
attention. . .to broader investigations into the numerous other cases of killings and
disappearance in Aceh.”
